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NOTES 
FELONIOUS, ERRONEOUS, IT’S ALL ODIOUS:  
A STORY OF DEBT GONE WRONG 
Virginia M. Brown* 
 
Iraq is paying off debt from Saddam Hussein’s rule.  South Africa is 
paying off debt obligations incurred under apartheid rule.  Argentina is 
renegotiating debts that can be traced back to a de facto military-civilian 
regime that was ousted in 1976.  There are numerous examples in which 
sovereigns are paying off debts that previous governing regimes incurred 
while oppressing their citizens.  Should sovereigns be obligated to pay these 
debts?  Were the debts really incurred by the sovereign or were they 
incurred by the governing regime in question?  What if the lender knew in 
advance what the proceeds would be used for? 
The doctrine of odious debt seeks to resolve this dilemma.  It proposes 
that sovereigns should not have to pay back debts that were incurred 
without the consent of the people and for purposes that do not benefit the 
people, provided that the lender was aware of each of these conditions.  The 
doctrine itself is almost a century old, but sovereigns have yet to embrace it 
due to fear of the repercussions.  Scholars have proposed ex ante and ex 
post mechanisms to apply the doctrine, but none have been accepted to 
date.  This Note proposes a unique solution that seeks to identify odious 
expenditures before debt proceeds are entirely exhausted by a regime, 
providing a remedy that falls between the traditional ex ante and ex post 
solutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sovereigns have questioned the legitimacy of odious debt1 for more than 
a century, at least since William H. Taft arbitrated Great Britain v. Costa 
Rica2 (“the Tinoco Arbitration”) in 1923.3  The topic has been debated in 
the scholarly community since Alexander Sack formalized the doctrine in 
1927.4  After a period of relatively little dialogue on the matter, the topic 
was revitalized in 2003 with the crumble of the Saddam Hussein regime.5  
The newly instated Iraqi government successfully renegotiated its debt with 
the Paris Club,6 representing one-third of its total postregime external debts, 
down 80 percent.7  It did so with the support of key U.S. and World Bank 
(or “the Bank”) officials who advocated for the forgiveness of Iraqi bond 
debt that was used for odious purposes.8  At its core, the doctrine of odious 
debt seeks to resolve the moral and economic dilemma9 of what should 
happen to a sovereign’s debts after a despotic regime incurs the debt for 
purposes that do not benefit its citizens and is subsequently overthrown.10 
A whitepaper published by the Obama-Biden campaign in 2008 has since 
politicized the issue in the United States:  “As president, Barack Obama 
will lead a multilateral effort to address the issue of ‘odious debt’ by 
investigating ways in which ‘loan sanctions’ might be employed to create 
disincentives for private creditors to lend money to repressive, authoritarian 
regimes.”11  No significant political progress has been made since Obama 
raised the issue during his initial election.  However, the ongoing debt 
debate regarding Argentina’s debt, as evidenced in NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
 
 1. Odious debt was traditionally defined as “debts incurred by a despotic regime that do 
not benefit the people bound to repay the loans.” Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert 
B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1203 (2007). 
 2. 1 R.I.A.A. 371 (1923). 
 3. Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1216–18. 
 4. See id. at 1218. 
 5. See generally Jai Damle, The Odious Debt Doctrine After Iraq, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 139, 150 (2007) (“Following the regime change in Iraq, there was an increase in 
conferences and articles on odious debt.”); Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might 
Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 393 (2005). 
 6. The Paris Club is an informal group of creditors that tries to develop sustainable debt 
payment solutions for debtor nations. PARIS CLUB, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/JSH8-TPNJ]. 
 7. See MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAQ’S DEBT RELIEF:  PROCEDURE 
AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEBT RELIEF 9 (2006), http://fpc.state. 
gov/documents/organization/65761.pdf [http://perma.cc/D2MA-QNV2]; YVONNE WONG, 
SOVEREIGN FINANCE AND THE POVERTY OF NATIONS:  ODIOUS DEBT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 
(2012); see also Associated Press, Eighty Percent of Iraq Debt Cut by Paris Club, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 21, 2004), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-11-21-iraq-
debt-cut_x.htm (“The United States had been pressing for up to 95% of the Paris Club debt 
to be lifted.”) [http://perma.cc/G2AN-EGFH]. 
 8. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 9. 
 9. For a discussion of the moral and economic justifications that have been given for 
the doctrine, see infra Part II.C.1. 
 10. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1224. 
 11. OBAMA FOR AMERICA, STRENGTHENING OUR COMMON SECURITY BY INVESTING IN 
OUR COMMON HUMANITY, http://www.cgdev.org/doc/blog/obama_strengthen_security.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/D4UT-Y9CM]. 
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Republic of Argentina,12 beckons a new tide of literature and discussion on 
this sovereign debt issue. 
This Note begins in Part I by providing a broad overview of sovereign 
debt.  It then looks at issues specific to odious debt, including a discussion 
of the basics of odious debt, the historical background, and the importance 
of addressing the issue today.  Part II first reviews proposed ex post 
institutional remedies to the doctrine.  It then steps back to look at the ex 
ante solutions developed by scholars.  In Part III, this Note proposes a 
solution falling between ex ante and ex post solutions that expands the role 
of traditional actors in sovereign debt issuances. 
I.  FROM THE TOP:  
SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE 
This part first provides a general overview on sovereign debt, including 
some distinguishing factors between sovereign and corporate debt and the 
specific challenges presented by sovereign debt.  It then explores issues 
specific to odious debt.  It concludes by stating why the issue needs to be 
addressed today. 
A.  An Overview of Sovereign Debt 
Sovereigns, like corporations, are able to increase their available funds by 
incurring debt or raising capital.  Corporations seek equity by issuing 
stock.13  Sovereigns, instead, impose taxes on their constituents to fund 
their budgetary needs.14  In lieu of diluting their ownership structure, 
businesses may incur debt to raise capital,15 such as by taking out loans or 
issuing bonds.16  Rather than taxing its people to raise funds, countries may 
also incur debt through the same channels.17 
Despite their apparent similarities in fundraising, there are several 
distinctions between loans and bonds.  Loans are traditionally issued by a 
single lender who engages in high level monitoring of the debtor.18  Due to 
the steep costs associated with monitoring loans, they are traditionally 
highly illiquid and cannot be traded.19  Bonds, on the other hand, are 
 
 12. 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012); see infra note 139 (providing an overview of the NML 
Capital litigation). 
 13. See Yankov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance 
Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 450 (1999). 
 14. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1211. 
 15. See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 13, at 450. 
 16. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter?  The Rise of the 
Leveraged Loan Market, 39 J. CORP. L. 725, 727 (2014) (describing the traditional 
differences between loans and bonds and arguing that in recent years “bonds and loans are 
now virtually interchangeable”).  Fontenay describes changes in the structuring of loans that 
have led to an established market for trading on loans, lessening the traditional distinctions 
between the two forms of debt. Id. 
 17. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1211. 
 18. See de Fontenay, supra note 16, at 727. 
 19. See id. 
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traditionally held by a large variety of bondholders who do not engage in 
intense monitoring.20  Bonds are usually highly transferrable.21 
Securitization22 of sovereign debt began in the 1990s and has permitted 
traditional investors to invest in sovereign debt.23  Most sovereign bonds 
are issued under New York or English law.24  Foreign sovereign bonds 
governed by New York law are typically issued through a fiscal agency 
agreement.25  This agreement provides the terms of the bond and the 
relationship between the fiscal agent and the debtor issuing the bond (the 
issuer).26  Under fiscal agency agreements, the agent represents the bond 
issuer, not the bondholders.27  Each bondholder retains its enforcement 
rights against the issuer.28 
The primary alternative arrangement for issuing bonds is through a trust 
indenture or trust deed.29  Under English law, the standard practice is to 
structure a sovereign bond issuance pursuant to a trust deed.30  In a 
departure from the fiscal agent approach, this method utilizes an indenture 
trustee who represents the bondholders.31  The indenture provides the terms 
of the issuance, including the face value of the bond, payment terms, rights 
of the bondholders, and duties of the trustee.32  U.S. trust indentures vary 
slightly from English trust deeds, but both allocate at least some 
enforcement capabilities to the trustee, such as the ability to accelerate bond 
payments in case of a default.33  Default provisions, such as acceleration 
 
 20. See id.  Bonds can be held by investment banks and regular retail investors. See id.; 
see also Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?  The Role of Litigation 
in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1072 (2004). 
 21. See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 13, at 450. 
 22. Securitization is the packaging of separate financial products into a single product, 
which then issues different tranches of the product to investors. See de Fontenay, supra note 
16, at 741 n.84. 
 23. See generally Gelpern, supra note 5, at 397. 
 24. Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings 1950–2010:  Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 41 (IMF, Working 
Paper No. WP/12/203, 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4B33-DTC9]. 
 25. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1317, 1332 (2002); Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1103. 
 26. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1102. 
 27. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25, at 1332; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 
1102. 
 28. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25, at 1332. 
 29. See id. at 1331–32; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1102–03. 
 30. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1103. 
 31. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25, at 1331; Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders 
and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 413 (1986). 
 32. See generally Ad Hoc Comm. for Revision of the 1983 Model Simplified Indenture, 
Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 BUS. LAW. 1115 (2000) [hereinafter Revised Model 
Simplified Indenture]. 
 33. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25, at 1330–31; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, 
at 1103.  Unlike the bond trustee, the fiscal agent generally lacks the discretionary power to 
accelerate bond payments. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25, at 1330. 
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clauses, permit the use of court proceedings by bondholders to protect their 
rights under the agreement against the debtor.34 
Distinctions between sovereign and corporate debtors are apparent when 
reviewing the capabilities of the issuer to pay its debts.  When a corporate 
debtor becomes insolvent, there are bankruptcy regimes established to settle 
its debts with creditors through debt restructuring.35  In the absence of a 
successful reorganization, a corporation’s debt ends with a liquidation of 
assets and the dissolution of the company.36  Similar to a corporation, a 
sovereign could arguably liquidate some of its assets.37  Unlike a 
corporation, however, a sovereign debtor can—at least in an abstract 
sense—always pay its debt.38  The government may increase taxes or divert 
domestic production to generate foreign export revenue.39  With these 
capabilities, it becomes more difficult to determine the extent of a country’s 
insolvency.40 
And further unlike corporate entities, no bankruptcy mechanism currently 
exists to liberate a country from its debts;41 thus, sovereign entities do not 
have the ability to dissolve when they are unable to pay their debts.42  Even 
when a new government regime takes over, the country’s legal personality 
continues, requiring the state to assume the debt incurred by the country 
under the predecessor regime.43 
Sovereigns, thus, face a unique problem in which they cannot cleanse 
themselves from previously incurred debt.44  The lack of an institutional 
remedy does not preclude sovereigns from attempting to renegotiate their 
debts directly with the bondholders.45  However, it has led some 
 
 34. See Revised Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 32, at 1135–39 (providing the 
defaults and remedies provisions under Article 6 of the model indenture). 
 35. Thomas S. Wyler, Wiping the Slate:  Maintaining Capital Markets While Addressing 
the Odious Debt Dilemma, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 947, 955–56 (2008). See generally THOMAS 
H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 8–11 (1986) (discussing the 
fundamentals of bankruptcy law and creditor remedies outside of bankruptcy). 
 36. See Wyler, supra note 35, at 956. 
 37. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual 
Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 133 (2012) (“Greece, for example, 
could theoretically sell the Parthenon or some of its sovereign territory.”). 
 38. See Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:  Statutory Reform or 
Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2013) (“If a company fails to repay 
its debts, the business can be dismantled by the unpaid creditors.  However, no parallel 
mechanism exists to force repayment by sovereign nations since no creditor has the ability to 
dismantle or liquidate a country.”). 
 39. See id. at 1488. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1207. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets:  The 
Modern Law and Policy, 42 HARV. INT’L J.L. 355, 362 (2001). 
 44. See Anna Gelpern, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 
1095, 1119 (2013) (asserting “the idea of a truly fresh start is essentially inconceivable for a 
sovereign”). But cf. JACKSON, supra note 35, at 225–52 (discussing individuals’ ability to 
obtain a fresh start under bankruptcy law). 
 45. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1044.  The restructuring may result in a new 
payment schedule, lower debt obligation, or both. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra 
note 24, at 7. 
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bondholders to take advantage of the institutional shortcoming by holding 
out from a sovereign’s debt restructuring plan and seeking payment of the 
full contracted amount in the courtroom.46 
These holdout creditors are commonly referred to as “vulture funds.”47  
Vulture funds generally purchase sovereign debt at a deep discount after the 
country has been in financial distress for an extended period of time and the 
bond’s value has significantly dropped.48  While most bondholders agree to 
debt restructurings in these circumstances, vulture funds hold out for full 
repayment on their investments.49  The average payout for a successful 
vulture fund is between three and twenty times the actual price the fund 
paid for the debt.50 
NML Capital, Ltd. (“NML Capital”) is one such vulture fund.51  
Argentina defaulted on its bond debt in 2001.52  NML Capital, a holder of 
the Argentine bonds, has since refused to participate in the country’s 2005 
and 2010 debt restructurings.53  Instead, the fund sought full payment in the 
Southern District of New York.54  The court held that Argentina had 
violated the terms of its bond agreements and the fund was entitled to full 
payment.55 
In addition to the traditional restructuring negotiations that develop 
privately between sovereigns and their bondholders, there have been some 
recent efforts to address the lack of a formal system to discharge sovereign 
debts.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed a restructuring 
 
 46. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1075–88 (discussing sovereign debt 
cases involving Argentina, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia); Gelpern, supra 
note 5, at 394 (“The erosion of sovereign immunities since the 1950s exposed governments 
to a real risk of creditor lawsuits in national courts.  The result was a boon for the 
development of private law in an area previously dominated by foreign ministries.”). See 
infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text for a discussion on why this switch occurred in 
the 1950s. 
 47. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1045 n.2; John Muse-Fisher, Starving the 
Vultures:  NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina and Solutions to the Problem of 
Distressed-Debt Funds, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1671, 1673 (2001).  While the term has negative 
connotations, some scholars suggest that holdout creditors may actually be beneficial. 
Compare Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 24, at 28 (noting that creditor holdouts 
and litigation is widely seen as the main reason for delayed and inefficient debt 
restructurings), with Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1098–99 (arguing that vulture funds 
may actually improve the restructuring process and steer sovereigns away from opportunistic 
defaults), and Gelpern, supra note 44, at 1102 (citing that “[r]ecent empirical studies confirm 
that . . . holdouts have not held up many sovereign bond restructurings”). 
 48. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1045 n.2; Muse-Fisher, supra note 47, at 
1673. 
 49. See Caroline M. Gentile, The Market for Odious Debt, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
151, 167 (2010) (“[Vulture funds purchase] the debt of troubled issuers for pennies on the 
dollar and then, once a violation of the terms of the bonds occurs, seek to enforce their rights 
(including, when applicable, the right to the repayment of the full value of the debt) through 
litigation.”). 
 50. See Muse-Fisher, supra note 47, at 1673–74. 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 1674. 
 52. See Gelpern, supra note 44, at 1117; Muse-Fisher, supra note 47, at 1689. 
 53. See Muse-Fisher, supra note 47, at 1689. 
 54. See infra note 139. 
 55. See infra note 139. 
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mechanism in 2001 to address this institutional shortcoming.56  However, it 
failed to pick up traction due to institutional inadequacies and a lack of 
support from the United States.57 
The Group of Seven (“G-7”)58 agreed to the Debt-Relief Initiative for 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC Initiative”) in 1996.59  This 
initiative resolved to provide debt relief to a large number of the world’s 
least developed countries.60  While noble in its goal, the initiative faced 
criticism by traditional advocates of HIPC debt relief because, it was 
argued, the debts were incurred by regimes wrought with unaccountable 
corruption and wasteful spending.61  Essentially, these advocates feared that 
sovereigns would not benefit from the debt relief because they would 
continue the same policies as before.62  Should the sovereign be given debt 
relief if its policies will likely change?  Should debt relief be permitted for a 
sovereign that was ruled by a corrupt regime when it incurred the debt, but 
has since been overthrown?  These are questions for the doctrine of odious 
debt.63 
B.  A Dialogue on Odious Debt 
Odious debt has been a controversial type of sovereign debt, and 
countries have historically avoided its application.  Yet, it has sound public 
policy justifications that are supported by scholars and politicians alike.  
The international economy can benefit from limiting the funds available to 
despotic regimes that cause undue harm to people.  This section begins with 
a basic overview of the odious debt doctrine.  Next, it reviews different 
categories of debt that may be classified as odious.  It then evaluates which 
type of shift in control merits use of the doctrine.  The section concludes 
with a review of some of the doctrine’s applications throughout history. 
 
 56. See Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., IMF, Address at the National 
Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner:  International Financial Architecture for 2002:  
A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov. 26, 2001), https://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm [http://perma.cc/KG45-6D6N]; see also Sean Hagan, 
Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 301–
02 (2005). 
 57. See infra notes 250–59 and accompanying text. 
 58. The G-7 consists of major industrial countries (namely, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) that periodically convene to discuss 
major economic and financial issues. A Guide to Committees, Groups, and Clubs, IMF (Sept. 
17, 2015), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#G7 [http://perma.cc/DFU7-
SNAB]. 
 59. See James V. Feinerman, Odious Debt, Old and New:  The Legal Intellectual History 
of an Idea, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 214 (2007). 
 60. See id.  The initiative provided the specific level of relief that it felt was necessary 
“in a particular country to achieve ‘debt sustainability.’” NANCY BIRDSALL & JOHN 
WILLIAMSON, DELIVERING ON DEBT RELIEF:  FROM IMF GOLD TO A NEW AID ARCHITECTURE 
25 (2002). 
 61. See BIRDSALL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 60, at 33; Feinerman, supra note 59, at 
214–15. 
 62. See BIRDSALL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 60, at 32. 
 63. See, e.g., Andrew Yianni & David Tinkler, Is There a Recognized Legal Doctrine of 
Odious Debts?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L. & COM. REG. 749, 751 (2007). 
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1.  Breaking Down the Basics 
Alexander Sack’s formalization of the doctrine of odious debt called for 
three conditions to be met before absolving a state of its obligation to repay 
its debts:  (1) the debts must be incurred by a despotic power; (2) the 
proceeds must result in an absence of benefit to the sovereign’s 
constituents; and (3) the creditor must be aware of the first two 
conditions.64 
The first element requires that a despotic regime incur the debt.  This 
means that there must be an absence of consent by the people to the 
government in place.65  This begs the question of whether a democratically 
appointed government is necessarily precluded from the odious debt 
analysis.66 
The second element requires a determination that debt proceeds were not 
used for the benefit of a country’s populace.  This is not an exact science.  
What makes the use of debt odious under the doctrine?  The use of debt 
proceeds by a tyrannical leader to suppress internal dissent of its people is 
clearly odious.67  A despot using proceeds to fly Aerosmith in to the 
country to perform at his daughter’s fifth birthday would also be odious.68  
But is hiring Nobel Prize-winning economists to count the grains of sand in 
a desert odious or simply a poor use of resources?69 
The third prong of Sack’s formulation is that the creditor is aware that the 
debts were incurred absent consent of the people and were used for 
purposes that lack benefit to the people.  In essence, a culpable creditor 
accepts the risk of default, shifting the burden of debt payment away from 
innocent citizens.70  Put differently, creditors should not have to suffer the 
consequences if they were deceived by the regime.71  The subjective nature 
of this element has faced criticism.72  Requiring positive knowledge of the 
 
 64. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1218 (citing ALEXANDER N. 
SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET 
AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÉRES [THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS ON THEIR 
PUBLIC DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] 157–63 (1927)); Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff 
King & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 1–2 (CISDL, Working Paper 
No. COM/RES/ESJ/, 2003), http://www.dette2000.org/data/File/odious_debt_CISDL.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/BR4W-L9GK]. 
 65. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1218. 
 66. Id. at 1228–29.  Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson warn that odiousness is a 
subjective concept and can invite ethnocentrism. See id. 
 67. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Odious Debt in Retrospect, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 
267 (2007). 
 68. See generally Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1231 (describing loans 
made to a regime which are then stolen by its members). 
 69. See id. at 1231, 1245 (using the “grains of sand” example to show that pointlessly 
incurred debts may still bind a noncorrupt sovereign and its people). 
 70. Id. at 1251. 
 71. See Wyler, supra note 35, at 966–67. 
 72. See Christopher G. Paulus, “Odious Debts” Vs. Debt Trap:  A Realistic Help?, 31 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 83, 94–95 (2005); see also Seema Jayachandran, Michael Kremer & 
Jonathan Shafter, Applying the Odious Debts Doctrine While Preserving Legitimate Lending 
18 (June 2006), http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21472/ApplyingtheOdiousDebtsDoctrine.pdf 
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creditor may permit the creditor to circumvent the doctrine by not 
determining the use of debt proceeds.73  A more objective “known or 
should have known” standard could have a more sound application.74 
Under the doctrine, odious debts are considered debts of the government 
regime rather than the sovereign itself, because the debt proceeds are not 
used for the needs and interests of the sovereign.75  Sack’s argument is that 
these debts can only be collected from a particular odious regime if all three 
elements have been met.76  As such, the successor government should be 
able to legally repudiate debt incurred by its despotic predecessor.77  Sack’s 
determination is made after the fact;78 that is, a regime and its debts cannot 
be found odious until the debt proceeds are used and the regime has been 
overthrown.79  As discussed below, some scholars have approached the 
doctrine from an ex ante method in an effort cut off potential lending to 
despotic regimes that are likely to generate odious debts.80 
2.  Defining Odious Debt 
The question of what satisfies the second prong of Sack’s test—that the 
country uses debt proceeds in a way that does not benefit its people—has 
been subject to different interpretations.  There is insufficient application of 
the doctrine to establish any customary uses or limitations.  As such, 
scholars have advanced their own categories to analyze types of odious 
debt. 
Sack advanced two categories of odious debt:  (1) debts used to “repress 
the population that fights against [the despotic regime],” and (2) debts 
incurred by members of government which are “manifestly personal” in 
use.81  Recent commentators have expanded the number of classifications. 
Andrew Yianni and David Tinkler have identified three types of odious 
debt:  hostile debt, war debt, and debt of a developing country that does not 
benefit its people.82  Hostile debt, they argue, is used “aggressively against 
the interests of a population,” such as for war, conquest, and suppressing its 
own citizens.83  They distinguish this from war debt, which is incurred by a 
 
(arguing that the subjective standard is too lenient on creditors) [http://perma.cc/MC28-
69MS]. 
 73. See Paulus, supra note 72, at 94–95; see also Jeff A. King, Odious Debt:  The Terms 
of the Debate, 32 N.C. J. INT’L & COM. REG. 605, 632–33 (2007). 
 74. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1251. 
 75. See King, supra note 73, at 624. 
 76. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1218 (citing SACK, supra note 
64, at 157). 
 77. See WONG, supra note 7, at 7; Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1218 
(citing SACK, supra note 64, at 157). 
 78. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1218. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See infra Part II.B. 
 81. See Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 750 (citing PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS 
DEBTS:  LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION AND THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 
165–66 (1991)). 
 82. See id. at 756–66. 
 83. Id. at 757. 
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state that subsequently loses during a war.84  The conquering government 
may choose which war debt obligations of the predecessor government it 
would like to assume.85  The third type of debt Yianni and Tinkler propose 
is debt of a developing country that is not in the interest of its people.86  
This would include using the proceeds for personal items, such as building 
lavish mansions and other corrupt purposes.87 
Jeff King developed a very similar breakdown of odious debt that he 
separated into four categories:  war debts, subjugation debts, illegal 
occupation debts, and fraudulent, illegal, or corruption debts.88  King’s 
“subjugation debts” and “fraudulent, illegal, or corruption debts” 
correspond with Yianni and Tinkler’s first and third classifications 
discussed above, respectively.89  Illegal occupation debt is based on the 
presumption that “foreign occupation can bring no benefits [to a 
sovereign’s citizens] unless benefits are specifically proved.”90  He 
distinguishes odious war debts, which he describes as debts used by a 
predecessor state in war against the successor state, from non-odious war-
related debts.91 
Lee Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, and Robert Thompson distinguish war debts 
as being separate from odious debt.92  Like odious debt, war debts are an 
arguable exception to the general rule of state succession.93  The war debts 
exception asks whether debts incurred by a previous regime should be 
enforceable against a conquering state.94  It asks what expectations a 
creditor should reasonably have when extending credit to a sovereign that is 
eventually overthrown by an attacking country.95 
3.  Applying the Doctrine 
Sack’s classic formulation only applies when there has been a 
government succession.96  However, the legal community currently lacks a 
consensus on whether to apply the doctrine to government succession or 
 
 84. See id. at 760. 
 85. See id. at 761.  See infra notes 106–13 for an example of war debts during the 
Spanish-American War. 
 86. See Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 761–62. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See King, supra note 73, at 650–59. 
 89. See id. at 650–52; supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 90. King, supra note 73, at 652. 
 91. See id. at 650.  For example, the United States could not have regarded Iraq’s 2003 
debts as war debts because “the United States was neither the target of the armed attack such 
loans funded nor the successor state to Iraq.” Id. at 629. 
 92. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1212–14.  The authors define 
war debts as those incurred “to finance the conduct of hostilities against a force, foreign or 
domestic, that eventually succeeds in overthrowing the contracting government.” Id. at 1212. 
 93. See id. at 1212–14. 
 94. See id.  For example, after Great Britain took over the South African Republics at 
the end of the Boer War, it only offered to assume the Republics’ debts that were incurred 
before the start of the war. See id. at 1212–13. 
 95. See id. at 1213. 
 96. See Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727, 
739 (2007). 
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also to state succession.97  A government succession occurs when the 
governing body changes but the sovereign itself remains intact.98  Recent 
examples of government succession include the regime changes in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.99  A state succession occurs “when a territory ceases 
to be part of one state and becomes part of another.”100  Under the doctrine 
of state succession, the incoming government automatically inherits debts 
of the predecessor government.101 
The distinctions between state and government succession, however, are 
not always clear.102  Professor D.P. O’Connell warns that the distinction 
between the two may be so minimal that the classification of a transition “is 
often quite arbitrary.”103  Even if the distinction were clear, a number of 
scholars advocate expanding the doctrine to cases of state succession.104 
4.  Contextualizing Odious Debt with a Historical Backdrop 
While the doctrine of odious debt has been developed and refined by 
scholars over the last century, it has never been expressly cited as grounds 
for forgiving sovereign debt by a national or international tribunal.105  This 
section first discusses the Spanish-American War and the Tinoco 
Arbitration, two of the most frequently cited pieces of history by advocates 
of the doctrine.  Next, it describes the shift in the landscape provided by the 
U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.  Finally, it addresses the 
restructuring of Iraqi and Argentine debt over the last twenty years, which 
have helped renew the odious debt discussion. 
a.  The Spanish-American War 
By the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Spain had contracted a 
large amount of debt that was secured by Cuban revenues.106  The United 
States, having seized the Cuban territory, repudiated the debts under 
 
 97. See King, supra note 73, at 648 (describing a lack of consensus in the scholarly 
community). 
 98. See Fiebelman, supra note 96, at 739. 
 99. Tai-Heng Cheng, Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 7, 11 (2007). 
 100. Fiebelman, supra note 96, at 739; see also Cheng, supra note 99, at 10.  For an 
example of state succession after the Spanish-American War, see infra notes 106–13. 
 101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 208 note (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“International law sharply distinguishes the succession of 
states, which may create a discontinuity in statehood, from a succession of governments, 
which leaves the statehood unaffected.”). But see King, supra note 73, at 609 (arguing “it is 
still far from settled law that a successor state is liable for the debts of the predecessor 
state”). 
 102. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1206; Khalfan, King & Thomas, 
supra note 64, at 47. 
 103. 1 D.P. O’CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW vi 
(1967). 
 104. See, e.g., King, supra note 73, at 648–50; Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra note 64, 
at 47. 
 105. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 406. 
 106. See id. at 404. 
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multiple theories, including that the debts were not agreed to by and did not 
benefit the Cuban people.107  Evidence supported this assertion and 
indicated that the debt proceeds, which were added to Spain’s national 
budget, ultimately helped oppress the Cuban people.108 
Initially, Spain argued that the United States should be responsible for 
the debts as they were contracted by Spain when it was the legitimate 
governing sovereign of Cuba.109  The United States countered that Spain 
was in exclusive control of Cuba’s finances and, therefore, Cuba itself had 
not actually contracted the debts.110  During treaty negotiations, both the 
United States and Spain asserted several theories in support of their 
positions.111  At one point, Spain offered to disclaim all debts not used to 
aid improvements in Cuba.112  Ultimately, however, the United States 
succeeded in repudiating all of Cuba’s outstanding debts.113 
b.  The Tinoco Arbitration 
Dictator Frederico Tinoco ruled Costa Rica from 1917 to 1919.114  Prior 
to being overthrown, Tinoco was able to secure financing from the Royal 
Bank of Canada that assisted in his escape but that never made its way to 
the Costa Rican people.115  An arbitration ensued in 1923 when the bank 
tried to enforce the debts in Costa Rica.116 
The sole arbitrator, William H. Taft, distinguished this government 
succession from the circumstances involved in a state succession (such as 
the one dealt with after the Spanish-American War).117  Taft found that a 
change of government has no effect on the debt obligations of the state, but 
that the loan itself was fraudulent.118  The bank could not “base its case for 
repayment on ‘the mere form of the transaction’ but must prove its good 
faith in lending the money ‘for the real use of the Costa Rican Government 
under the Tinoco regime . . . for its legitimate use.’”119  But here, the bank 
knew that the loan proceeds would be used for the personal benefit of 
Tinoco.120 
 
 107. See id.; Gentile, supra note 49, at 154–55. 
 108. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1215; Sara Ludington, Mitu 
Gulati & Alfred L. Brophy, Applied Legal History:  Demystifying the Doctrine of Odious 
Debt, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 247, 251–52 (2010). 
 109. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 253. 
 110. See Gentile, supra note 49, at 154–55; Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, 
at 253. 
 111. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1214–16; Ludington, Gulati & 
Brophy, supra note 108, at 250–58. 
 112. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 255. 
 113. See id. at 256. 
 114. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1216. 
 115. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 411; Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 762. 
 116. See generally Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1 R.I.A.A. 371 (1923). 
 117. See id. at 380; Cheng, supra note 99, at 16; Gelpern, supra note 5, at 411. 
 118. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 411. 
 119. Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 258 (quoting Great Britain, 1 
R.I.A.A. at 394). 
 120. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 411. 
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Some scholars, however, do not agree that the arbitration supports the 
doctrine.  Sarah Ludington, Mitu Gulati, and Alfred L. Brophy argue that 
“first, Tinoco was not clearly a despot; second, Taft was an 
archconservative and an unlikely champion of debt-burdened fledgling 
democracies; third, Taft applied a substance-over-form analysis” by stating, 
in essence, that the loans were actually made to Tinoco, not to Costa 
Rica.121  Despite this criticism, the Tinoco Arbitration is still cited as a 
leading example of the odious debt doctrine in action. 
c.  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
Sovereigns are generally protected from litigation in domestic courts 
under the theory of sovereign immunity.122  This theory began to face 
scrutiny in 1952 after the United States adopted a principle that allowed 
sovereigns to be sued in connection with borrowing money abroad.123  This 
was later codified in the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 
the U.K. State Immunity Act of 1979, and numerous similar laws in other 
countries.124  These laws showed a level of acceptance in giving up 
sovereign immunity, but did not provide significant help to creditors in 
enforcing judgments.125 
d.  The Iraq War and Argentina’s Debt Restructuring 
Since the Tinoco Arbitration, the odious debt doctrine has been 
implicated on several occasions.126  Recent examples include debt 
restructurings conducted by Iraq and Argentina over the last two decades.  
Neither sovereign chose to utilize the doctrine. 
The doctrine was implicated with the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003.  
When Saddam Hussein was ousted in 2003, Iraq had approximately $125 
billion in external debt, including a mixture of bilateral, commercial, and 
multilateral (e.g., IMF) creditors.127  Average per capita income in Iraq had 
 
 121. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 260. 
 122. See Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious Regimes?, 70 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 91 (2007); Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 37, at 135. 
 123. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. 
Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 984–85 
(1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 714 (1976) 
(“[I]t will hereafter be the Department [of State’s] policy to follow [a] restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of 
sovereign immunity.”).  Under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, immunity is 
extended to public acts of a state, but not to private acts. See Alfred Dunhill of London, 425 
U.S. at 711–13. 
 124. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 396 n.21. 
 125. See id. at 396.  For example, Argentina has refused to pay out creditors despite a 
court holding that creditors are entitled to payment. See id. at 402. 
 126. Examples of this include Nazi Germany’s refusal to assume Austrian debts after its 
annexation in 1938, postrevolution China’s refusal to accept prerevolution debts in 1952, and 
France’s refusal to assume debts in its administration of Algeria in 1962. See King, supra 
note 73, at 634–35. 
 127. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 1. 
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dropped from $3836 in 1980 to $715 in 2002.128  Some members of 
Congress proposed the repudiation of these debts under the Iraq Freedom 
From Debt Act in 2003.129  Iraqi officials did not wish to utilize the 
doctrine for debt repudiation, and Congress failed to gain sufficient support 
to pass the Act.130  Ultimately, however, negotiations between Iraq and the 
Paris Club led to an 80 percent reduction of Paris Club and commercial 
debt.131  Iraq is also supposed to receive an overall debt cancellation of 80 
percent from all of its creditors.132  By 2010, Iraq had reduced its external 
debt to $45 billion.133 
Argentina can attribute a portion of its current debt back to debt incurred 
by the Junta, a de facto military-civilian regime that ousted the government 
in 1976 and increased the public debt eightfold in a period of a few 
years.134  Still coping with a significant debt trap, former Argentine 
President Nestor Kirchner argued during his 2003 inaugural address, “We 
cannot go back to paying our debts at the expense of hunger and exclusion 
of Argentines generating more poverty and increasing social conflicts.”135  
Creditors, Kirchner argued, cannot collect if Argentina does not do well.136  
In 2005, Anna Gelpern reasoned that “[i]f Argentina succeeds [in major 
debt restructurings], it will show in graphic terms that most countries 
considering [o]dious [d]ebt have ready alternatives for securing deep debt 
relief without proving state succession, illegitimacy, or specific knowledge 
by the creditors, and without costly and time-consuming claim-by-claim 
 
 128. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REBUILDING IRAQ:  U.S. ACHIEVEMENTS THROUGH THE 
IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND 1 (2006), http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/60952.pdf [http://perma.cc/BM42-3JVA]. 
 129. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 15; see also Cheng, supra note 99, at 26 (“It is 
noteworthy that the United States’ call for debt cancellation was not merely for the benefit of 
the Iraqis.  It also benefitted the U.S. government.”). 
 130. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 15; WONG, supra note 7, at 8 (“Although not using the 
actual terminology of odious debt, the underlying principles of Sack’s doctrine were 
espoused by the USA in its rhetoric on Saddam, Iraq’s debt, and Iraq’s repayment 
obligations.”). 
 131. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 1; Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious 
Debts?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 54 (2007) (“Iraq received one of the largest write-
offs ever (eighty percent) in the Paris Club.” (citing Andy Metzger, A Mission Accomplished, 
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at 1)). 
 132. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 10. 
 133. See Government Debt, CENTRAL BANK OF IRAQ, http://www.cbi.iq/index.php?pid= 
GovernmentSecurities (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/5GB6-UVNA]. 
 134. Ellen Brown, Cry for Argentina:  Odious Debt, Fiscal Mismanagement or Pillage?  
Financial Mechanisms Which Spearhead Nations into Bankruptcy, CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON 
GLOBALIZATION (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/cry-for-argentina-odious-
debt-fiscal-mismanagement-or-pillage-financial-mechanisms-which-spearhead-nations-into-
bankruptcy/5395691 [http://perma.cc/M84Q-XWTC]. 
 135. Doctor Nestor Kirchner, President of the Republic of Arg., Discurso del Señor 
Presidente de la Nación Ante la Honorable Asamblea Legislativa [Inaugural Address of 
President Kirchner] (May 25, 2003), http://www.presidencia.gob.ar/discursos-2007/24414, 
English translation available in Argentina:  Full Text of Kirchner’s Inaugural Speech, BBC 
MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS (May 26, 2003) [http://perma.cc/MN72-M8WN]. 
 136. Gelpern, supra note 5, at 408 n.57 (citing Inaugural Address of President Kirchner, 
supra note 135). 
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adjudication.”137  By 2010, Argentina managed to reach an agreement with 
92 percent of its bondholders to accept about one-third of their original 
investment.138 
Today, Argentina is still faced with holdout creditors from the 
restructuring.139  Bonds held by these creditors can be traced back to the 
1970s.140  While Argentina could still raise a defense of odious debt, 
pointing to the Junta’s series of illegitimate policies, it has yet to do so.141 
C.  Revitalization of the Odious Debt Doctrine 
For the handful of instances in which the doctrine of odious debt has 
been implicated, there is an overabundance of examples in which the 
indebted country has wished not to implicate the doctrine.142  Countries that 
have accrued unwieldy debts and are undergoing administrative changes 
could gain tremendously from the doctrine.  Yet, there is a fear of potential 
economic backlash—such as higher interest rates and limited access to 
capital—in invoking this doctrine to relieve the debts.  This section 
discusses the need for an odious debt doctrine and the fear sovereigns have 
in using it. 
1.  A Need for the Doctrine 
There is continuing debate among scholars on whether the forgiveness of 
odious debt is a question of economic or moral consequence.143  Gelpern 
suggests that one lesson from Iraq’s recent debt restructuring is that the 
international community is willing to provide assistance when a country’s 
financial distress represents an “extraordinary political threat,” but that the 
same sentiment is not availed to those dealing with periodic government 
wrongdoing.144 
 
 137. Id. at 410. 
 138. See Argentina’s Fernandez de Kirchner Wants Creditor Talks, BBC NEWS (June 20, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27951439 [http://perma.cc/TZ67-P9PE]. 
 139. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.  In October of 2012, the Second 
Circuit found that Argentina had breached its debt agreement; it affirmed the district court’s 
orders to enjoin Argentina from making payments to its restructured bonds without making 
ratable payments to its other bondholders, and it remanded to the district court on the issue 
of clarifying the impact of its injunction on third parties. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic 
of Argentina, 699 F.3d. 246, 262 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act will not immunize Argentina’s extraterritorial assets from postjudgment 
discovery).  On remand, the district court amended its injunction orders against Argentina, 
and the Second Circuit affirmed. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 
230 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014). 
 140. See Brown, supra note 134. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 143. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 85–87 (discussing the moral and economic 
arguments for the doctrine); see also Wyler, supra note 35, at 948 (stating “the scholarly 
motivations behind [the doctrine] vary widely—some believe it’s a moral question; others 
believe it is an economic one”). 
 144. Gelpern, supra note 5, at 400. 
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Under the moral argument for the doctrine, some despotic regimes are so 
reprehensible that they should be condemned by discouraging third parties 
from lending to them.145  Odious debt incurred by a predecessor regime 
should not be binding on the state’s citizens and the regime that replaces 
it.146  They should be deemed unenforceable as a matter of justice.147  This 
justification, however, is complicated by the fact that odious regimes do not 
always use proceeds for odious purposes.148 
The economic justification for the doctrine is that it can be used to 
increase the welfare of the sovereign after the despotic regime has been 
removed.149  Sovereigns may benefit from a lower debt burden, a lower 
likelihood of the emergence of odious regimes that reduce welfare, and a 
lower likelihood of long-lasting odious regimes.150  By forcing countries to 
pay off cumbersome debt burdens, cycles of economic failure can be 
ongoing.151  In developing countries, it is less likely that their outstanding 
debt is from original debt obligations than from accrued interest and 
refinancing of those original obligations.152  In addition, “[f]ailed states are 
increasingly recognized as posing significant threats to the security of the 
global community.”153  By forgiving the odious debt of a country, the 
doctrine facilitates rebuilding the sovereign’s government and infrastructure 
in a timely manner.154 
Scholars disagree on whether there is sufficient state practice and case 
law to support the doctrine.155  As mentioned above, no tribunals have 
expressly used the doctrine as a ground for canceling a country’s sovereign 
debt.156  Moreover, some scholars argue that the doctrine “stands on rather 
 
 145. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 85; see also Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, 
supra note 108, at 251–58 (discussing the moral justification for debt forgiveness in Cuba 
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 146. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 85. 
 147. See id.; Sabine Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Ius Cogens, Transitional 
Justice and Other Trends of the Debate on Odious Debts:  A Response to the World Bank 
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may be used for beneficial projects such as building bridges or roads, or expanding access to 
clean water.”). 
 149. See id. at 86; Tom Ginsburg & Thomas S. Ulen, Odious Debt, Odious Credit, 
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 150. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 86; see also Wyler, supra note 35, at 950. 
 151. See Wyler, supra note 35, at 950. 
 152. See Feinerman, supra note 59, at 215. 
 153. Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, at 2. 
 154. See id.; Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 131, at 49 (arguing that creditors are 
frequently in a better position than a sovereign “to protect against [the] harm of 
insolvency”); Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, at 2. 
 155. See Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 147, at 64. 
 156. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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weak ground” as an international law principle.157  Without an established 
law governing the issue, sovereigns pursuing debt relief must use the 
common law of courts and customary international law.158  Moreover, 
courts must substitute different validations for permitting forgiveness of a 
country’s debt.  Unfortunately, no single jurisdiction governs the vast 
majority of external sovereign debt.159  With different jurisdictions applying 
different substantive law, inconsistent precedents are established.160 
2.  The Fear of the Doctrine 
Numerous opportunities to invoke the doctrine of odious debt have 
presented themselves in the past.161  In some situations, only two of Sack’s 
elements were present, but at other times all three elements were well 
evidenced.162  Nevertheless, sovereigns continuously choose not to invoke 
the doctrine.163  They are often afraid of raising the doctrine themselves.164 
A country that is suitably positioned to invoke the doctrine is one that has 
just rid itself of a despotic leader that incurred large debts providing no 
benefit to the individuals under its rule.  Likely, the country’s people have 
just surmounted a great amount of strife to overthrow the despot.  The 
country is in need of organizing its new government.  It is in need of 
economic stability, which will require the support of the international 
community.  The new government, lacking an established, credit worthy 
reputation, would be turning away from the debt obligations for which a 
promise to repay exists.165  As such, raising the doctrine could tarnish the 
country’s reputation with potential lenders in the international 
community.166 
 
 157. Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 147, at 64.  Scholars disagree on whether 
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 159. See id. at 248–49. 
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Free Limited v. Republic of Kenya would not meet Sack’s second prong because “in the 
absence of [a bribe to Kenya’s president], it would be difficult to argue that a contract to 
build substantial facilities at two major airports would be against the interests of Kenya”), 
with Damle, supra note 5, at 139–40 (discussing the Apartheid’s debt in South Africa). 
 163. As noted above, Iraqi officials adamantly fought against invoking the doctrine, even 
though there was international support for its use. See supra note 130 and accompanying 
text. 
 164. See, e.g., Damle, supra note 5, at 140; Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 
72, at 2. 
 165. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 407; Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, 
at 2 (arguing that “successor governments to illegitimate regimes do not invoke the odious 
debt doctrine out of fear that doing so would deprive them of necessary access to global 
credit markets”). 
 166. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 407. 
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South Africa’s clean break from the apartheid regime in 1994 is 
frequently named as an ideal case for the doctrine’s application.167  South 
Africa feared that its ability to borrow in the future would be hurt if it did 
not continue its debt payments and so did not raise the doctrine.168  In 
another example, Nigeria incurred a significant amount of debt under 
despotic regimes that were subsequently overthrown.169  Since 1986, the 
country has been involved in five Paris Club restructurings without raising 
the odious debt doctrine.170 
This fear may ultimately be misplaced.  For example, after the Civil War, 
eight southern states were able to scale down or repudiate their 
Reconstruction-era debts by claiming that corrupt state governments 
incurred them.171  There are multiple other examples in which U.S. states 
have been able to refuse payment on certain debts while maintaining a 
reputation of financial reliability to future creditors.172 
II.  FROM THE GROUND UP:  
CURRENT DOCTRINAL APPROACHES 
The odious debt doctrine has gained significant traction in the scholarly 
community over the last decade as countries continue to struggle to pay off 
debts when there are moral and economic justifications for forgiving them.  
This part looks at possible ways to establish a formal odious debt doctrine 
in order to solve this dilemma.  Scholars are often divided on the question 
of whether the solution is in an ex post judicial mechanism or an ex ante 
labeling scheme.  The ex post methods first argued by Sack in the early 
twentieth century are reviewed in Part II.A.  Part II.B. then analyzes the 
more recently developed ex ante approach. 
A.  The Ex Post Approach 
This section first reviews tactics that can be used in the courtroom.  Next, 
it looks at the use of the U.N. Security Council to decide when the doctrine 
should be implemented.  It concludes with proposed solutions that involve 
the World Bank and the IMF. 
 
 167. See Damle, supra note 5, at 139–40; Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 752. 
 168. See Damle, supra note 5, at 140; A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and 
the Odious Debt Doctrine:  The Missing Link in the Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 
64 (2007) (“The new South African leaders did not repudiate [their apartheid-era] debts, 
most likely because they were concerned that doing so would harm the country’s ability to 
attract foreign investment.”). 
 169. See Damle, supra note 5, at 152–54; Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 767 n.123. 
 170. See Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 767.  Prior to its 2005 Paris Club deal, the 
Nigerian legislature had resolved to repudiate its foreign debts. See Damle, supra note 5, at 
152.  Between 1956 and 2007, there were more than four hundred Paris Club restructuring 
deals involving more than eighty indebted countries. Id.  Iraq is one such example of a recent 
restructuring. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
 171. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 275–79. 
 172. See Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 147, at 96. 
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1.  Courtroom Solutions 
This section first discusses traditional courtroom tactics, including public 
policy considerations, the doctrine of unclean hands, and agency law 
remedies.  It then discusses the ability of courts to invoke the doctrine of 
odious debt under customary international law. 
The third prong of Sack’s formulation—requiring the creditor to have 
knowledge that the loan proceeds were obtained without the consent of the 
people for a purpose that does not benefit the people—raises public policy 
concerns.173  Creditors may be enticed into funding a sovereign’s odious 
plans through above-market interest rates or outright bribes.174  The U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 may find such action to be 
criminal.175  A similar remedy under the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 would 
also be available.176  In the case of government succession, most scholars 
find little authority for the doctrine beyond cases in which the lender was 
bribed or otherwise corrupt.177 
A debtor sovereign may also defend itself through the doctrine of unclean 
hands.  Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson propose that a lender be denied 
recovery if the debtor sovereign successfully pleads the unclean hands 
defense.178  The defense blocks debt recovery if the lender is “tainted with 
inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which [one] seeks 
relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the 
[sovereign].”179  When there are public policy concerns, the defense 
“assumes even wider and more significant proportions.”180  This defense is 
not new to the sovereign context.  In Adler v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria,181 the defense was successfully used to bar recovery to the 
plaintiffs who participated in a criminal scheme with Nigerian government 
officials.182 
An agency law remedy is possible by analogizing a sovereign’s 
constituents and their government to a corporate principal and its agents.183  
 
 173. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1232. 
 175. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012) (requiring issuers to maintain records that fairly and 
accurately reflect the issuer’s transactions and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls). 
 176. See Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (UK). 
 177. See, e.g., King, supra note 73, at 665. 
 178. Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1235–37. 
 179. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945).  
For an application in the U.K. context, see, for example, Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v. 
Highland Financial Partners LP [2012] EWHC (Comm) 1278, [para. 175] (Eng.), http:// 
www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2012/1278.html [http://perma.cc/3DP3-SANU]. 
 180. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 815. 
 181. 219 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 182. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1236–38 (summarizing Adler). 
 183. See id. at 1237–38.  There is an open question as to whether the sovereign’s people 
or the sovereign itself should be the principal. See Deborah A. DeMott, Agency by Analogy:  
A Comment on Odious Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 161 (2007) (“The 
composition of [a country’s] people will also shift over time, making the people, as opposed 
the . . . state, less tractable as a principal [than the sovereign itself].”). 
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Under agency law, an agent is able to bind its principal if it acts with actual 
or apparent authority.184  If the agent has no such authority when binding its 
principal, the principal can still act to ratify the agent’s actions.185  If the 
agent, however, colludes with a third party in a manner adverse to the 
principal, the principal should not have to assume the liability for that 
agent’s wrongful acts.186  A principal is therefore not liable to a lender 
when the lender is aware that the agent is acting for its personal benefit.187 
In corporate law, a legal fiction separates the entity from its shareholders 
who enjoy limited liability.188  However, this legal fiction can be abused 
and ultimately removed by a court or tribunal.189  The United States argued 
at the end of the Spanish-American War that the bonds secured by Cuban 
revenues were actually attributable directly to Spain.190  This argument is 
analogous to “veil piercing” in the corporate context.191  Under this 
doctrine, an innocent lender can seek payment directly from a shareholder 
when the shareholder’s wrongdoing warrants direct collection by the lender. 
In the sovereign context, citizens are not protected by limited liability, 
and the government itself is not directly liable for the sovereign’s debts.192  
As such, a country and its citizens have unlimited liability to repay the 
debts once the regime has been overthrown.193  Veil piercing in the 
sovereign context would permit a lender to collect directly from a despot.194  
Moreover, once a court finds that a lender knowingly funded a regime for 
its odious purposes, the citizens would no longer be responsible for paying 
back the debt.195 
Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson do warn that these corporate defenses 
would only achieve some of the objectives of odious debt.196  Lenders 
would have reason to be more cautious before lending to regimes.197  
However, elements of these defenses can be difficult to prove and may not 
permit a full debt cancellation.198 
 
 184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01, 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 185. Id. § 4.01. 
 186. Id. § 5.04 cmt. c. 
 187. See id.; Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1243. 
 188. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1246–47; McDaniel, supra note 
31, at 420. 
 189. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 268. 
 190. See supra notes 106–13 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 268. 
 192. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1248–50. 
 193. Id. at 1249. 
 194. See id. at 1248; Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 254. 
 195. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1251; Ludington, Gulati & 
Brophy, supra note 108, at 254 (discussing the application of the veil-piercing argument by 
the United States against Spain after the Spanish-American War). 
 196. Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1261. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. at 1251–56, 1261; Stephan, supra note 160, at 224 (“What existing national 
law does not do, however, is rescind a contract when the loan contract was unwise . . . in the 
absence of a national law forbidding the borrowing authority from undertaking the 
transaction.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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Parties generally select English or New York law in choice of law 
provisions in bond indentures.199  Analyzing the doctrine under the laws 
and practices of the United States and United Kingdom may not, however, 
be enough.  Courts may decide to integrate rules of customary international 
law into their domestic law.200  However, the doctrine has not yet become 
customary international law.201  Gelpern suggests that, if anything, it is “a 
doctrine of public-international law aspiring to the status of customary 
international law.”202 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice provides an authoritative 
list of sources of international law.203  These include international 
conventions, international custom, general principles of law recognized by 
states, and, as a secondary source, judicial rulings and teachings of industry 
experts.204  To become a rule of international law, it must be invoked “in 
accordance with a constant and uniform usage by the [sovereigns] in 
question.”205  However, the doctrine’s limited uses in the past show 
insufficient practice for a finding of customary international law.206 
Professor Paul Stephan builds off of this issue in a discussion of his 
“bottom-up” approach to recognizing odious debt under customary 
international law.207  Under this approach, Stephan argues the doctrine 
could become a part of customary international law upon a finding made by 
an authoritative tribunal.208  Such a finding would also pressure courts in 
the United Kingdom and New York to accept the doctrine of odious 
debts.209  Unfortunately, courts in separate jurisdictions may ultimately 
 
 199. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 200. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 221.  The Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino did not question New York State courts’ ability to look toward customary 
international law for support, but held that federal common law would not look to it. 376 
U.S. 398 (1964).  “Absent application of the Sabbatino override, then, New York courts (and 
presumably British ones as well) have the power to invoke international custom and 
conceivably might do so with respect to the odious debt doctrine.” Stephan, supra note 160, 
at 223. 
 201. See Emily F. Mancina, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God:  Resurrecting the 
Odious Debt Doctrine in International Law, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1239, 1252 
(2004) (“[The odious debt doctrine] does not exist under any treaties, nor does it exist in 
state practice, as no state has explicitly invoked it and prevailed by raising the doctrine as a 
defense to a legal obligation to repay its debts.”); Paulus, supra note 72, at 91. 
 202. Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 85 (2007) (noting 
odious debt lacks sufficient state practice and opinio juris). 
 203. See Statute of International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, http://www. 
icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_II [http://perma.cc/8J2M-
54CT]. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 (Nov. 20). 
 206. See Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 768. 
 207. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 229–31. 
 208. Id. at 229.  It is unlikely, however, that a single holding by an international tribunal 
would be sufficient to establish a customary law. See Gelpern, supra note 202, at 85 (“To 
qualify as custom, a legal norm traditionally must ‘harden’ through general, consistent 
practice of states over time, which must be ‘accepted as law’—that is, experienced as 
binding and legal, rather than habitual, discretionary, or accidental.”). 
 209. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 229. 
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apply the doctrine in different circumstances, creating an inconsistency in 
its application.210 
Because the last quasi application of the odious debt doctrine occurred 
during the Tinoco Arbitration nearly a century ago, its adoption would 
likely shock the sovereign debt market, increasing legal risks.211  Further, 
there is no solid definition of odious debt in customary international law.212  
Courts could limit the doctrine’s application to sovereigns subject to 
sanctions of the Security Council.213  Alternatively, courts could create a 
presumption of odiousness when sufficient repression and instances of 
murder are seen.214 
Another issue arises in waiting for customary international law to 
develop in tribunals:  most sovereign debt restructurings do not involve any 
arbitration or litigation.215  Sovereign debtors have generally used tools 
available in the official sector to resolve debt issues.216  Negotiations 
between a sovereign and its bondholders may result in a partial debt 
cancellation, longer debt maturities, or lower interest rates.217  Sovereigns 
participating in renegotiations of their debt will not, however, use the 
doctrine as an express reason for requesting relief.218  Moreover, partial 
debt cancellation does not fulfill the moral or economic justifications for the 
doctrine.  Despotic leaders may still obtain loans for odious uses, and 
sovereigns may nonetheless be faced with outstanding debt obligations that 
they are unable to pay. 
2.  The U.N. Security Council 
After the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, the U.N. Security Council 
froze all Iraqi assets held by U.N. member nations.219  It also immunized all 
Iraqi wealth from oil and gas production, an industry representing more 
than 75 percent of Iraq’s economy at the time, from creditors’ grasps.220 
As evidenced by this example, the U.N. Security Council already has a 
significant amount of authority.221  Under the U.N. Charter, the Security 
 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. at 229. See generally Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1 R.I.A.A. 371 (1923). 
 212. See Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 147, at 63; Stephan, supra note 160, at 
230 (“A judge seeking to . . . determine what qualifies as odious would find a wealth of 
opinion but no clear and determinant core.”). 
 213. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 230. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. at 218. 
 216. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 400.  For example, the U.N. Security Council required 
its member nations to transfer all Iraqi assets in their jurisdictions to a specially designated 
development fund. See id. at 395.  Iraq was subsequently able to reduce its debt obligations 
through renegotiations with Paris Club bondholders. See id. at 402. 
 217. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 24, at 7–8. 
 218. See generally supra Part I.C.2. 
 219. See supra note 216. 
 220. See S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 22 (May 22, 2003), http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/pdf/ 
resolution1483_iraq_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/4EHV-RN82]; Gelpern, supra note 5, at 394–
96. 
 221. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 227. 
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Council can impose economic sanctions on abusive regimes when that 
abuse threatens international order.222  As such, it could order member 
states not to recognize the debts incurred by odious regimes.223 
While states are obligated to carry out Security Council resolutions, the 
resolutions do not automatically translate into binding domestic law.224  
The Security Council also cannot act without consensus among all of its 
permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.225  As such, leaving decisions of odious debt to the Security 
Council may have “little practical significance.”226 
3.  World Bank and IMF Solutions 
Some experts believe that the World Bank or IMF may be better suited to 
offer institutional remedies for the doctrine.227  This section looks at the 
solutions involving the World Bank and IMF in turn.  It then looks at 
criticisms of both approaches. 
Unlike the Security Council, a Board of Governors governs the World 
Bank, and voting is done by subscription.228  The purpose of the World 
Bank, in part, is to “assist in the reconstruction and development of 
territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for 
productive purposes.”229  The World Bank has been revisiting its 
anticorruption efforts over the last decade.230  The Bank is already in the 
practice of categorizing corrupt states and monitoring corruption and budget 
transparency.231  Continuing efforts could allow the World Bank to play a 
role in monitoring the use of debt funds.232  The act of categorizing 
governments could also assist in developing an ex ante approach to odious 
debt.233 
While there are procedural efficiency justifications to promoting the 
World Bank’s role in evaluating potential odious debt claims, the Bank 
 
 222. See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ [http:// 
perma.cc/3RLE-3HC9]. 
 223. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 227. 
 224. See id. (“National governments may cite a Security Council resolution as a basis for 
adopting a domestic law, but a refusal to carry out a resolution may result only in another 
resolution.”). 
 225. See U.N. Charter arts. 23(1), 27(3). 
 226. Stephan, supra note 160, at 227. 
 227. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 104 (“For policing systematic plundering, the 
most logical decisionmaker would be either the World Bank or the IMF . . . .”); Ginsburg & 
Ulen, supra note 149, at 133 (“We believe the IMF and World Bank are better vehicles for 
addressing the odious debt problem than the United Nations.”). 
 228. See Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. [IBRD], Articles of Agreement, art. V, 
§§ 2–3 (Dec. 27, 1945), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-
articlesofagreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/5P8R-MJB7]. 
 229. Id. art. I. 
 230. See Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 131, at 72; Damle, supra note 5, at 154. 
 231. See Corruption Measurement, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/W9P7QIN 
6M0 (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/J3M6-LXBY]; see also Damle, supra note 
5, at 154; Feinerman, supra note 59, at 209. 
 232. See Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 131, at 72. 
 233. See infra Part II.B. 
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itself does not support the doctrine.234  The World Bank criticizes it for the 
lack of support found in customary international law and suggests a 
different approach of improved lending and borrowing practices.235  The 
World Bank also advocates debt reduction rather than debt forgiveness.236 
The IMF is also governed by a Board of Governors with voting done by 
subscription.237  The IMF conducts regular financial reviews of its 
members.238  It arguably collects better financial data about a sovereign 
than other outside parties and would likely uncover fund misappropriations 
that occur.239  If the IMF took a role in the identification of odious debt, it 
could deny IMF funds to the odious regimes and declare any previous debts 
unenforceable.  The IMF could also use its review process to establish an ex 
ante mechanism for labeling odious regimes.240  In 2000, a U.S. advisory 
commission recommended a similar mechanism in a report on reforming 
international financial institutions.241  It recommended that confirming the 
soundness of a country’s public finance policies should be a prerequisite for 
IMF bailout funds during a crisis.242 
The IMF has also proposed the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism243 (SDRM).  The SDRM was proposed as a framework to 
provide debtor countries and their creditors with incentives to quickly come 
to a restructuring agreement in an economically efficient manner.244  The 
mechanism was based on four central bankruptcy principles: 
(1) prevent creditors from blocking renegotiations by seeking 
repayment through the court system; 
(2) encourage creditors to provide capital to assist with the 
debtor country’s financing needs; 
(3) remove the collective action problem by binding minority 
creditors, once approved by a sufficient majority; and 
 
 234. See Vikram Nehru & Mark Thomas, The Concept of Odious Debt:  Some 
Considerations 23 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. WPS4676, 2008). 
 235. See id. at 26–38. 
 236. See Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 147, at 106; Nehru & Thomas, supra 
note 234, at 35. 
 237. Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF], Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. 12, § 5 
[hereinafter Articles of Agreement of the IMF], https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/ 
[http://perma.cc/QF96-CDQT]. 
 238. See id. art. IV; Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 104. 
 239. See Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box:  How Should a 
Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 809 (2004); Bolton 
& Skeel, supra note 122, at 104. 
 240. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 104–05. 
 241. See id. 
 242. See id. at 105. 
 243. See Krueger, supra note 56. 
 244. See IMF, IMF Board Discusses Possible Features of Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism, PIN No. 03/06 (2003) [hereinafter IMF Board Discusses Possible Features], 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2003/pn0306.htm [http://perma.cc/9U32-ZAHR].  
Most directors of the IMF “agreed that an amendment of the [IMF’s] Articles would provide 
the most appropriate vehicle for the establishment of the SDRM.” Id. 
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(4) provide some guarantee that the debtor would act responsibly 
during the process.245 
Under the SDRM, authority would be given to a Sovereign Debt Dispute 
Resolution Forum (SDDRF) to rule on legal challenges to specific loans.246  
The SDDRF would be an independent body created under the IMF Articles 
of Agreement.247  If issues arise that risk undermining a debtor sovereign’s 
restructuring process, the SDDRF could provide a stay in the creditors’ 
collection efforts.248  In addition to dealing with traditional restructuring 
issues, the SDRM could permit sovereigns to petition the SDDRF to allow 
cancellation of odious debt.249 
The SDRM faced immediate criticism.250  The private sector in the 
United States and abroad was critical of the proposal to limit individual 
investors’ rights and perhaps increase the frequency of restructurings.251  
Creditors were concerned that the proposal was merely a power grab by the 
IMF and criticized it for favoring debtor countries.252  Some directors of the 
IMF Executive Board feared the SDRM’s objectives actually went beyond 
the scope of the IMF’s purposes.253  They also questioned the 
appropriateness of amending the Articles of Agreement to allow for the 
creation of the new mechanism.254 
Krueger argued that IMF involvement was “essential” to the SDRM’s 
success.255  She claimed that the IMF was the “most effective channel 
through which the international community can reach a judgment on the 
sustainability of a country’s debt and of its economic policies.”256  She did 
admit, however, that the IMF would require some outside support in 
verifying creditor claims and occasionally adjudicating disputes among 
creditors and/or debtors.257 
 
 245. See Krueger, supra note 56.  The fourth element was later removed from the IMF’s 
proposal. See IMF, Report of the Managing Director to the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee on the IMF’s Policy Agenda 16–17 (Apr. 2003) [hereinafter IMF 
Policy Agenda], http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2003/041103.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
DU6N-XM4Z]. 
 246. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 239, at 779; IMF Board Discusses Possible 
Features, supra note 244. 
 247. See IMF Board Discusses Possible Features, supra note 244. 
 248. See id. 
 249. See Bradley N. Lewis, Restructuring the Odious Debt Exception, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
297, 337–39 (2007). 
 250. See, e.g., Hagan, supra note 56, at 391, 392 n.251 (discussing opposition from the 
United States and the private sector). 
 251. See id. at 392–93. 
 252. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 398; Hagan, supra note 56, at 345 (observing that “for 
an institution that is already perceived by many as being excessively powerful, concerns 
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 253. See IMF Board Discusses Possible Features, supra note 244. 
 254. See id. 
 255. Krueger, supra note 56. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See id. 
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Two years after its proposal, the IMF acknowledged a lack of sufficient 
support by member nations and abandoned the project.258  Just before being 
shelved in 2003, John Snow, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary, argued that the 
use of collective action clauses, not the SDRM, was the correct method for 
resolving restructuring issues.259  Given the United States’s presence in the 
IMF, it would be impossible to implement an SDRM-like infrastructure 
without U.S. support.260  Moreover, it would be difficult to implement any 
restructuring mechanism—with or without the IMF—without U.S. 
support.261 
While the World Bank and IMF are structured in a way to provide a more 
equal voting process than the Security Council, the SDRM example above 
shows that the organizations are not free from political sway.262  In 
particular, Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel, Jr. suggest that the IMF has 
“been driven more by political pressures by the United States or other G-7 
members than by the economics of the crisis in question.”263  After all, the 
United States’s voting shares are more than double that of the next highest 
voting member in the World Bank and almost three times that of the next 
highest voting member in the IMF.264  Both organizations are also subject 
to an institutional bias.  As lenders themselves, both organizations have 
been accused of consciously financing oppressive governments that 
ultimately use the funds to “affirmatively harm” their citizens.265  The IMF 
in particular was criticized for trying to make restructurings easier through 
the SDRM and lowering the frequency with which the IMF would have to 
provide financial support.266 
 
 258. See IMF Policy Agenda, supra note 245.  More than 75 percent of voting power 
supported the SDRM, but 85 percent is necessary under the IMF’s Articles of Amendment. 
See Articles of Agreement of the IMF, supra note 237, art. 28; Jack Boorman, Special 
Advisor to the Managing Dir., IMF, Speech:  Dealing Justly with Debt (Apr. 30, 2003), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/043003.htm [http://perma.cc/SC4R-WD53]. 
 259. See John W. Snow, U.S. Sec’y of Treasury, Statement at the Meeting of the 
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http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IBRD 
CountryVotingTable.pdf (last updated Oct. 1, 2015) [http://perma.cc/2UTP-HB3R]; IMF 
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Even if the World Bank and the IMF were to overcome the difficulties 
discussed above, and fully accept the doctrine, there is a question of what 
rule of law they would each utilize in making their decisions.  As already 
discussed, customary international law is insufficient.267  The IMF would 
likely have to amend its Articles even to establish the SDRM.268  The 
SDDRF (or an institutional remedy created by the World Bank) would have 
to adopt some rules for evaluating use of funds.269  It would also need to 
have some legal authority to bind states and creditors.270 
Each of the proposed solutions for use outside of the courtroom lacks 
either international support or an established institution to implement the 
proposal—or both.  Moreover, each of these proposed solutions share one 
shortcoming:  by the time they can be utilized, the damage has already been 
done; the despot has already left the sovereign with large debt obligations 
that never benefitted the people.  Other strategies try to account for this 
inherent problem with the ex post approach. 
B.  The Ex Ante Approach 
Ex ante approaches are applied before a bond has been issued.  They seek 
to cut off financing before much of the financial hardship can be created.  
The alternative way to approach this problem is from an ex post perspective 
by excusing the debts of a sovereign once its despotic regime has been 
disposed but the financial hardship that it caused remains.  This section first 
discusses a labeling mechanism proposed by ex ante proponents.  It then 
discusses a relatively new contractual solution that has been proposed to 
ease the collective action problem in corporate defaults and, more recently, 
in sovereign defaults. 
1.  The Labeling Regime 
Proponents of an ex ante approach diverge from Sack’s model by seeking 
to identify odious regimes before they are able to issue bonds.271  By 
labeling a regime “odious,” potential creditors would effectively be put on 
notice that a successor government could repudiate the debts of its 
predecessor.272  An ex ante approach would also incentivize creditors to 
 
their own bailout support) [http://perma.cc/JH2G-KL3C]. But see Hagan, supra note 56, at 
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 267. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 268. See supra note 244. 
 269. The SDDRF would have used the substantive law of the relevant nation in its 
dispute. See Hagan, supra note 56, at 383.  However, there is no such law for evaluating 
what constitutes odious debt. See generally Part I.B.2. 
 270. See Hagan, supra note 56, at 386 (“[T]he binding effect of such actions assumes that 
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 272. See Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, at 5; Wyler, supra note 35, at 
949. 
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focus on due diligence.273  This section first looks at the basics of the 
regime.  It then discusses which institution should be responsible for 
making ex ante labeling decisions. 
a.  Restricting Funds to Odious Regimes 
Under the labeling regime, an international organization would label 
governments as “odious-debt prone.”274  Creditors would petition the 
organization for a ruling on a potential debtor sovereign based on the 
debtor’s proposed use of funds and the creditor’s due diligence model.275  If 
approved by the organization, the debt would remain enforceable in the 
event of a regime change.276 
Only debts incurred by governments given the odious-prone designation 
would be subject to possible cancellation.277  Once a designation has been 
given, the creditor would be responsible for monitoring the use of funds.278  
If the creditor fails to make a good faith effort with its monitoring 
obligations and the funds are used for illegitimate purposes, the debt would 
be forgiven if the despotic regime then falls.279 
Placing the burden of proof on the creditor alleviates some stress on the 
debtor, which is generally in desperate need of capital once a despotic 
regime has been overthrown.280  The shift also makes the creditor’s duty 
more onerous.281  This could lead the capital markets to tighten and be more 
difficult to maneuver.282  Ultimately, this would negatively impact regimes 
that have been deemed odious-prone, even if the regimes ultimately use 
bond proceeds for legitimate purposes.283  Taft effectively rejected this 
labeling approach in his Tinoco ruling for similar reasons.284 
Creditors who are effectively on notice will scrutinize a regime’s debt 
offering more heavily.285  As such, the ex ante labeling mechanism has the 
effect of attempting to halt lending to a despotic regime before it even 
 
 273. See Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, at 19–22. 
 274. See id. at 19. 
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 276. See id. at 20. 
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regimes.”). 
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starts.286  This could ultimately expedite the downfall of the authoritative 
government.287  However, it could also cut off vital financing for the 
country.288  When it does not cut off financing, it could otherwise eliminate 
the availability of market interest rate debt instruments.289  The approach 
itself has several risks and shortcomings; these are amplified by the lack of 
a labeling apparatus. 
b.  Creating a Labeling Institution 
Labeling of a sovereign as odious-prone is subjective in nature.290  As 
such, the institution making ex ante determinations would need to be 
composed of a group with similar viewpoints, allowing it to form a 
consensus regarding what is odious.291 
The labeling could occur under the auspices of the U.S. executive 
branch.292  However, the executive would be limited to ruling on U.S.-
governed bonds, and the United States does not have as dominant role in 
global capital markets as it once did.293  The U.N. is a possible solution, but 
it is not ideal.  Its members represent a diverse group of players with varied 
opinions on what may or may not be odious.294  The G-7 or Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development295 (OECD) countries could 
spearhead the effort.296  The groups both exist for economic and financial 
purposes, however, and may not wish to involve themselves in such a 
politically driven endeavor.297 
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An institutional labeling mechanism would have several shortcomings.  
Like the ex post approach, it would need to find authority upon which to 
act.  As mentioned above, there is no internationally recognized definition 
of odious debt.298  Consequently, the labeling institution would need to 
establish its own criteria for evaluating governments.299  The untested 
institution and lack of precedent defining odious debt would also increase 
the investment risk for the parties involved.  Additionally, individual 
bondholders may lack adequate incentive to request the labeling of a 
sovereign prior to lending.300 
2.  The Contractual Solution 
Perhaps the solution is not in spotting despotic regimes before they start 
spending debt proceeds, but in spotting them before they finish using the 
funds.  Professors Yankov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade, and Marcel Kahan 
propose the creation of a “supertrustee” role in the corporate context 
wherein the trustee would be given significantly more authority than it is 
currently given under a trust indenture.301  This arrangement emphasizes 
increased monitoring duties.302  This section first describes the trustee’s 
traditional role.  It then describes the proposed monitoring duty.  Next, it 
describes the supertrustee’s enforcement mechanisms.  Then, it discusses 
the recourse available to bondholders under the doctrine before describing 
the proposed supertrustee compensation.  It concludes by discussing 
barriers to the supertrustee model and the ideal circumstances for its 
adoption. 
In a traditional corporate context, the trustee’s role is very limited prior to 
default.303  The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 requires the appointment of an 
indenture trustee for each corporate bond.304  The trustee ensures debtor 
compliance with the indenture.305  It generally does so by requiring the 
debtor to issue an annual compliance certificate to the trustee.306  The 
trustee “may conclusively rely on” the certificates so that no extra due 
diligence is required.307 
 
 298. See generally supra Part I.B.2. 
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Bond ownership is often highly dispersed, and the bonds themselves are 
readily transferable.308  As a result, it becomes difficult for creditors to 
obtain the consent of bondholders in the event an amendment or waiver is 
needed.309  Thus, a collective action problem results:  individual 
bondholders generally have a relatively small cut of the overall outstanding 
balance and lack incentive to monitor debtor compliance and take positive 
steps toward resolving any problems.310 
This collective action problem would be resolved in the corporate context 
by appointing a supertrustee in the trust indenture.311  Like a standard 
indenture trustee, the supertrustee would act on behalf of the 
bondholders.312  As such, it would be in the company’s self-interest to 
select a credible supertrustee that bondholders would approve of, to reduce 
risk and acquire more favorable lending terms.313 
The supertrustee’s defining task is its duty to monitor the borrower’s 
compliance with the covenants in the indenture.314  Unlike a traditional 
trustee that relies on certificates issued by the borrower for compliance with 
the indenture’s terms and covenants, the supertrustee would be 
continuously engaged in independent monitoring.315  A traditional trustee 
lacks a contractual obligation to monitor the debtor.316  Accordingly, the 
new contractual arrangement would need to be laid out in the indenture.  
The supertrustee’s duty would be to “engage in the type and intensity of 
monitoring which a reasonable lender in the private debt market would 
engage in under similar circumstances.”317 
The supertrustee would also have the ability to renegotiate bond 
covenants.318  Trustees in the United States are generally only permitted to 
make technical amendments without bondholder consent.319  Trustees in the 
United Kingdom are currently allowed some discretion to renegotiate 
nonmaterially prejudicial trust deed terms that do not result in substantial, 
permanent changes.320  As a result of the stricter covenants and increased 
monitoring that would occur under the supertrustee model, renegotiations of 
key financial terms should occur less frequently.321  Consequently, the 
proposed corporate model does not require the supertrustee to have the 
power to renegotiate core financial terms.322  Doing so, however, could ease 
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collective action and holdout problems.323  Authors Amihud, Garbade, and 
Kahan propose that the corporate issuer have the option, but not the 
obligation, to allocate this power to the supertrustee.324 
An indenture trustee generally holds the same enforcement capacity as 
the bondholders and is obliged to follow instructions from the majority-in-
interest bondholders.325  In the event of a material covenant breach under 
English law, the trustee must also seek bondholder approval for 
amendments.326  The power to enforce the indenture and seek amendments 
after a material breach under the proposed model would stay exclusively 
with the supertrustee, absent a default by the company.327  Given its 
ongoing monitoring obligations, the supertrustee would be in a better 
position to make these enforcement decisions.328 
Only bondholders representing a material portion of the bonds (e.g., 10 
percent), in aggregate, would be allowed to sue the supertrustee for a breach 
of its fiduciary duties.329  The supertrustee would not be liable to the 
bondholders for poor decisions unless it acted in bad faith or it dealt with an 
irreconcilable conflict of interest—known as self-dealing in the corporate 
context.330  Monetary liability of the supertrustee would be limited in the 
absence of willful, bad faith, or reckless actions.331 
Amihud, Garbade, and Kahan also suggest limiting the bondholders’ 
ability to replace the supertrustee.332  The indenture could limit removal of 
the trustee to “for cause” reasons, such as acting in bad faith.333  
Alternatively, it could allow for the periodic election or reelection of the 
supertrustee, with limitations set by the company as to possible trustees.334 
The supertrustee’s compensation would be set when appointed by the 
issuer and would only be amendable by approval of the bondholders.335  
The compensation would need to be higher than standard indenture trustee 
fees in order to reflect the added cost of continuous monitoring.336  It would 
also need to be positively correlated to increases in bond value in order to 
incentivize the supertrustee to complete its duties effectively.337  
Bondholders must also have adequate incentive to pay the supertrustee 
under a compensation structure that is significantly higher than that of the 
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standard indenture trustee.338  Higher compensation for the supertrustee 
could be justified by establishing a credible reputation for monitoring 
issuers.339  As mentioned above, bondholders lack incentive to monitor a 
relatively small bond investment.340  They will have a greater incentive to 
monitor a supertrustee who is representing them on multiple issues.341 
The supertrustee model would face barriers.  In particular, the Trust 
Indenture Act currently allows trustees to rely on debtor compliance 
certificates.342  It also requires unanimous bondholder consent to 
amendments of major terms under the indenture.343  Barriers aside, the 
supertrustee would be most beneficial to relatively large, long-term debt 
issuances that could take advantage of economies of scale.344  In order to 
take full advantage of the supertrustee model, it should be used for less than 
creditworthy or financially distressed borrowers where the supertrustee 
would likely need to play a more active role.345 
III.  MEETING IN THE MIDDLE:  
A SOLUTION THROUGH MONITORING 
Since the odious debt doctrine’s introduction in the early twentieth 
century, courts have yet to directly invoke it.346  Sack envisioned an 
institution reviewing pleas for debt relief by sovereigns newly freed from 
despotic rulers.347  Recent scholars have envisioned the prevention of 
lending to despotic regimes altogether.348  Even with a growing foundation 
of scholarly work on the doctrine, it remains largely unused and even feared 
by countries that present textbook cases for its application.349 
This part first addresses the insufficiencies that current approaches 
cannot overcome.  It next proposes an intermediate solution that resolves 
some of the shortcomings of current approaches.  It then dissects some 
criticisms that this proposed solution will likely face. 
A.  Insufficiencies with Current Proposals 
Current approaches to dealing with odious debt can be categorized by 
solutions that limit funding ex ante and provide relief ex post.  Each has 
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inherent shortcomings.  This section breaks down the inadequacies of each 
approach in turn. 
The labeling mechanism proposed by some scholars is idealistic, but not 
practical.  Bonds are issued to a large number of retail investors who 
individually lack the incentive to pursue an ex ante determination prior to 
purchasing a sovereign’s bonds.350  Like the collective action problem 
caused by NML Capital,351 individual bondholders cannot afford significant 
pre-lending due diligence such as paying an institution to label each 
borrower they come across.352 
Additionally, not all of a bond issuance will necessarily be used odiously.  
Denying capital to an odious-labeled country will stifle economic growth in 
the country while it is under the despotic regime’s rule.  This may 
accelerate the timeline in which the regime will be overthrown, but it will 
do so by burdening citizens of the sovereign. 
To gain support for an ex ante approach, potential users must trust that 
the system will be able to identify odious and non-odious regimes correctly.  
This would not be an easy task.  Regimes that incur odious debts may 
actually start out as legitimate governments.  It is not unthinkable that a 
democratically appointed government could receive a green light from the 
labeling institution and then turn odious soon after.353 
There is also no institution capable of labeling the regimes at present.354  
The World Bank already monitors foreign government corruption levels, 
but this is just one part of the problem.355  If a new institution were 
established, it would require significant capital to start.  Major economic 
players and contributors to other international institutions, such as the IMF 
and World Bank, would be likely capital providers.  Yet, the United States, 
which is a large capital contributor to these institutions, is skeptical of any 
institutional remedy for sovereign debt-related issues.356  Creditors are 
likely to be skeptical of the untested approach. 
The ex post judicial mechanism was formulated by Sack357 and sits on 
the opposite end of the spectrum from the ex ante approach.  Unlike the ex 
ante method, this approach is entirely debtor centric.  It provides relief for 
the debtor country, but leaves the bondholders empty-handed.358  Where the 
labeling mechanism may put creditors on notice beforehand or keep 
bondholders from actually acquiring a sovereign’s debt, the ex post 
approach simply forgives the debt without consideration to the bondholders. 
Perhaps under Sack’s third prong the bondholders should be left empty-
handed because they were aware that the proceeds would be used for odious 
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purposes.359  However, this argument is not as simple with respect to 
bondholders as it is with respect to traditional creditors.  Proving that all 
bondholders meet the third prong would be a near impossible task, leading 
to an ex post doctrinal approach with no actual application.  If the third 
prong was waived, sovereigns could receive the relief they demand, but 
innocent bondholders would be out of luck.  Bondholders would have a 
reason to be resentful toward the system and skeptical toward lending to 
other regimes in the future. 
The approach provides relief to debtor countries by allowing them to 
escape a potential debt trap.  The sovereigns are able to finance 
infrastructure projects and economic development in lieu of making interest 
and principal payments on previously incurred debts.  However, an ex post 
approach cannot remedy the significant damage already caused; bond 
proceeds have already been used to suppress a sovereign’s people or to 
assist a despotic leader in its escape. 
B.  Reforming the Roles of the 
Traditional Trustee and Fiscal Agent 
Ex post solutions provide relief to sovereigns, but come too late to help 
bondholders.  Ex ante solutions help bondholders, but risk denying 
sovereigns needed financing altogether.  The needs of both the debtor and 
the creditors can be met by bridging the gap between these two approaches.  
A new solution that adopts key elements of the supertrustee model 
discussed in Part II may resolve the shortcomings of the current 
approaches.360 
This Note proposes the apportionment of additional powers to the 
traditional bond trustee or fiscal agent in sovereign bond offerings.361  It 
uses the term “monitoring agent” to refer to a trustee or fiscal agent with 
amplified powers, which this Note argues provides a solution to the odious 
debt problem.  The monitoring agent solution will work best under an 
indenture trustee arrangement, but it may also have some application in a 
fiscal agency arrangement.362 
This section first addresses the appointment of the monitoring agent.  
Next, it delves into the agent’s increased responsibilities before discussing 
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how to keep the agent accountable to the bondholders.  It then proposes a 
compensation structure for the monitoring agent.  Next, it looks at features 
of the proposal that will be different under the fiscal agency agreement.  
Finally, it discusses situations in which the monitoring agent would be most 
effective. 
1.  Appointing a New Monitoring Agent 
The sovereign debtor should appoint the initial monitoring agent.363  The 
debtor would be incentivized to appoint a credible agent in order to lower 
the risk associated with its offering.  Under a trust indenture, the monitoring 
agent should be subject to reelection every five years by the bondholders.364  
This added security to the bondholders would permit them to replace an 
agent that is neglecting its monitoring duties without having to go through 
the formal replacement process provided for in the trust indenture.365  It 
would also put pressure on the agent to make a diligent monitoring effort.  
The sovereign should be allowed to limit the options for replacement agents 
by including a list of permitted agents in its offering documents.366  
Providing the sovereign with this capability would ensure it is not 
blindsided by a new monitoring agent that it fears does not fairly represent 
its interests. 
There are institutional barriers to replacing monitoring agents.  A five-
year gap between elections would provide some level of security to the 
agent so it is willing to build the infrastructure necessary to maintain its 
monitoring efforts.  A changeover of monitoring agents would be expensive 
because the new agent would lack the established processes of the previous 
agent.  As such, it is unlikely that a change in monitoring agents would 
occur for a superficial reason. 
2.  Allocating Additional Responsibilities 
The monitoring agent would need to ensure debt proceeds are used in an 
appropriate manner.  The agent would be in charge of continuous 
monitoring and should be granted the authority to accelerate bonds once the 
issuer has breached its covenants on the use of proceeds.  This delegation of 
powers permits the bondholders to maintain oversight and have the ability 
to act if the monitoring agent fails to act properly. 
The monitoring agent’s primary duty would be to monitor the use of 
proceeds.  Limitations on the use of funds would be included in the 
underlying document.  The sovereign would covenant not to use or allow 
funds to be used for any fraudulent, illegal, or corrupt purposes, or for any 
 
 363. This approach is proposed in the corporate context discussed supra note 311 and 
accompanying text. 
 364. The monitoring agent would not be subject to reelection under the fiscal agency 
agreement. See infra Part III.B.5. 
 365. See supra notes 332–34 and accompanying text. 
 366. See supra note 334 and accompanying text. 
762 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
purpose that subjugates its people.367  It is unlikely that sovereigns will 
reject these covenants because doing so may imply odious intent. 
The debtor sovereign would provide periodic reporting to the agent 
regarding fund usage, and the agent would have inspection rights in the 
event any reporting looks suspect.  Additionally, the monitoring agent 
would monitor the political and economic stability of the country while the 
funds are being spent.  Changes in stability could suggest a potential 
uprising or regime change and would cue the agent to conduct more 
aggressive monitoring.  Major investment banks would be best suited for 
this role, as their preexisting infrastructure would make monitoring more 
economically efficient. 
Once the sovereign has exhausted the proceeds, the increased monitoring 
duties would be eliminated.  The monitoring agent would then be allowed 
to rely on the compliance certificates permitted under the Trust Indenture 
Act.368  The underlying agreement between the bondholders and the 
monitoring agent would need to reflect the increased monitoring 
requirement while the proceeds are being used. 
Both U.S. and English law permit the agent or trustee to accelerate bond 
payments if an event of default occurs.369  Under this new structure, the 
monitoring agent’s power to accelerate would also extend to breaches of 
any covenants regarding the use of bond proceeds.  The benefit to 
accelerating payments is twofold:  the acceleration stops additional funds 
from being used odiously and it provides creditors the ability to recoup their 
investments.  This power should be shared with bondholders so that they 
may act if the agent fails to do so.  This permits the bondholders to act 
unilaterally in order to avoid unnecessary loss. 
Under U.K. bond issuances, the trustee is only allowed to renegotiate 
nonmaterial terms.370  U.S. bond issuances only allow technical 
amendments to be made by the trustee.371  Permitting the monitoring agent 
to renegotiate terms of the issuance has some advantages, but may be 
limited in its usefulness.372  The additional duty would also result in higher 
fees to the monitoring agent.  As such, the monitoring agent should only be 
permitted to negotiate technical amendments.373  Renegotiation of other 
terms would be conducted between the debtor sovereign and the 
bondholders.  This would alleviate increased costs to the monitoring agent 
framework and keep the agent’s role in line with current standards. 
 
 367. While many scholars also consider war debts to be odious, they are not included in 
this proposed solution. See, e.g., supra note 91 and accompanying text.  A covenant against 
incurring these debts is not feasible as it would essentially be a promise by the country not to 
be overthrown. 
 368. See supra note 343 and accompanying text. 
 369. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 370. See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra note 319. 
 372. See supra notes 323, 321 and accompanying text. 
 373. This is consistent with the current role of U.S. trustees. See supra note 319 and 
accompanying text. 
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3.  Keeping the Agent in Line 
The bondholders should have a limited right to sue the agent under a trust 
indenture in the event the agent fails to act when necessary.374  Only 
bondholders representing a material portion of the outstanding debts should 
be permitted to sue the monitoring agent for breach of duty.375  Amihud, 
Garbade, and Kahan suggest 10 percent may be a sufficient fraction in the 
corporate context,376 but this rate would be too low in the sovereign 
context.  A higher percentage should be used in order to ensure that a single 
large bondholder (e.g., a vulture fund) may not act on behalf of the entire 
group of bondholders.  Allowing a single bondholder to sue on behalf of all 
debtholders would ultimately give large bondholders full bargaining power 
and risk forcing the monitoring agent to act when the action is not in the 
best interest of the overall bondholder group.  The underlying agreement 
should dictate the level of bondholder support necessary in order to sue the 
monitoring agent. 
The monitoring agent’s liability should be limited in order to induce 
prospective agents to accept the position.  However, limitations should not 
apply where the agent has acted willfully, recklessly, or in bad faith.377  As 
such, bondholder relief should be limited if the agent negligently conducted 
its monitoring duties, but should not be limited if the agent accepted a bribe 
from a sovereign government to neglect its monitoring duties. 
4.  Compensating the Agent 
The monitoring agent’s duties and its potential liabilities would be higher 
than that of a traditional agent while bond proceeds are being used.  As 
such, its compensation must adequately reflect this.  The monitoring agent 
would receive increased compensation until the bond proceeds are 
exhausted and the increased monitoring duties are over.  Once the 
monitoring agent is able to rely on compliance certificates from the 
sovereign, its compensation would revert to a typical trustee or fiscal agent 
fee schedule. 
A fee arrangement that is positively tied to the bond’s market value was 
proposed for a corporate indenture supertrustee.378  Under this fee schedule, 
the trustee benefits from higher fees as the market value increases.379  This 
arrangement in a sovereign context is inadvisable.  If public perception of a 
sovereign’s political status begins to shift, such as a rising fear that a regime 
 
 374. Bondholders would not be able to sue under a fiscal agency agreement.  This 
limitation is ultimately reflected in lower fees given to the fiscal agent.  Nonetheless, the 
sovereign itself could still sue for a breach under the agreement.  This would be helpful 
where the monitoring agent failed to monitor the use of proceeds, the despotic regime has 
since been overthrown, and the bondholders have accelerated the payments. See infra Part 
III.B.5. 
 375. See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra note 331 and accompanying text. 
 378. See supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
 379. See supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
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has developed despotic tendencies, its credit risk is likely to increase.  This 
would decrease its market value just as the monitoring needs increase.  A 
negative correlation between the fees and the current market value would 
also inadequately address this issue because it would not incentivize the 
monitoring agent to perform its duties more effectively.  In order to 
adequately compensate the monitoring agent for the level of work and 
amount of liability it is taking on, the compensation would be inversely 
correlated to the unused bond proceeds.  As the bond proceeds are used, the 
monitoring agent’s compensation would decrease. 
The higher the level of monitoring that is required, the higher the agent’s 
fees during the monitoring period will need to be.  Monitoring agents would 
otherwise lack adequate incentive to take on a risky sovereign’s bond 
issuance.  Larger fees for more at-risk sovereigns result in bondholders 
demanding higher interest rates.  Interest rates reflect the level of risk 
associated with an investment.  Bondholders would require higher interest 
rates from politically or economically unstable countries.  As such, the 
monitoring agent’s increased fee structure could be baked into the higher 
interest rates. 
The agent’s compensation throughout the life of the bond would be 
determined at appointment.  Stable cash flows would encourage more 
financial institutions to seek out monitoring agent positions.  The 
compensation would only be amended by the bondholders under a trust 
arrangement or the issuer under a fiscal agency agreement.  However, the 
monitoring agent should reserve the right to petition the bondholders or 
issuer for an increased fee any time it is not being adequately compensated 
for its duties. 
5.  Fiscal Agency Agreement Considerations 
There would be no bondholder reelection opportunity under a fiscal 
agency arrangement, because the monitoring agent would represent the 
sovereign debtor.380  The agent would be appointed by the issuer and would 
only be subject to removal under the terms of the agreement. 
It is in the best interests of both the bondholders and the sovereign’s 
constituents to have proceeds used for non-odious purposes.  Yet, the 
monitoring agent is more at risk for being induced to breach its monitoring 
duties under a fiscal agency agreement due to its direct relationship with the 
sovereign.  As such, it is important that the sovereign’s constituents (in 
particular, the government that has replaced a despotic regime) be permitted 
to sue the monitoring agent for breach of duties. 
The monitoring agent’s fees under a fiscal agency arrangement should be 
lower than under an indenture trustee arrangement, because of a lower level 
of immediate accountability under the fiscal agency arrangement.  
Bondholders are incentivized to sue any time the agent has breached its 
monitoring duties under the trust indenture.  The sovereign, however, is 
 
 380. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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only incentivized to sue for failure to monitor if it has replaced a previous 
regime that used the debts for odious purposes. 
6.  Utilizing the Monitoring Agent Appropriately 
This Note proposes that the monitoring agent specifically be used to 
monitor for odious uses of debt.  The monitoring agent should only be 
appointed for bond issuances that are seen as more “at risk.”  While the 
agent’s fees will be lower where the sovereign is less risky, the fee will still 
be larger than that of a traditional fiscal agent or trustee. 
The World Bank’s data portal, which covers corruption and budget 
transparency, could be used to determine which at-risk countries should 
utilize a monitoring agent in their debt offerings.381  The monitoring agent 
could be required when the sovereign’s corruption and lack of transparency 
ratings are either greater than or significantly greater than (e.g., 20 percent 
greater than) the mean ratings. 
C.  Anticipated Criticisms to the Approach 
This Note does not purport to solve all problems with respect to odious 
debt.  There are risks and shortcomings to this approach; some are without 
merit and others will need to be left unresolved.  This section first discusses 
the possibility that the monitoring agent will overuse its new powers.  Next, 
it discusses the implications of allowing the monitoring agent to label a 
sovereign as odious.  Finally, it elaborates on what issues have not been 
addressed by the monitoring agent solution. 
1.  The Overreaction Possibility 
Opponents of the monitoring agent solution may argue that the creation 
of an agent empowered to identify odious uses of borrowed funds will 
overreact.  The fear is that the monitoring agent will seek to accelerate bond 
payments at the mere sight of questionable uses of funds.  This is unlikely 
due to the nature in which the monitoring agent is appointed.  It is in a 
sovereign’s best interest not to appoint a monitoring agent with a reputation 
for overreacting. 
2.  The Problem with Pointing the Finger 
The doctrine of odious debt has political implications.  By accelerating 
repayments, a monitoring agent claims that a government has used its debt 
proceeds to either subjugate its own people or for fraudulent, illegal, or 
corrupt purposes.382  Should monitoring agents be allowed to make such 
allegations? 
A sovereign is unlikely to concede that it has been using debt proceeds 
odiously without the ruling of an actual court. Sovereigns would be 
 
 381. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 382. See generally supra Part I.B.2. 
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incentivized to renegotiate terms with the bondholders in order to avoid the 
risk of an adverse outcome in court.  If negotiations fail, the question 
becomes which institution should be allowed to make findings at issue. 
As discussed above, a new international body or arbitration panel is 
unlikely to gain support in the international community.383  A traditional 
court system is a more likely avenue for resolving this use of proceeds 
issue.  A court determination on the issue of whether a sovereign has been 
using funds odiously has political implications, but they may be 
exaggerated.  For example, countries have been willing to waive their 
sovereign immunity for the last several decades.384  Investors can already 
sue sovereign debtors for failing to meet their obligations under a bond 
issuance, and courts can already order specific performance from them.385  
As such, the use of the doctrine in order to invoke debt forgiveness is 
arguably just an ancillary part to the theory of sovereign immunity. 
3.  The Limitations to the Doctrine 
The monitoring agent solution is intended to stop odious expenditures 
before complete damage is done.  It is intended to help creditors recover 
part of their investment rather than being left empty-handed.  The 
monitoring agent will not resolve all problems inherent to the odious debt 
doctrine.  Monitoring agents will be incentivized to perform their duties 
adequately, but they will not be able to perform their roles flawlessly.  It is 
possible that an agent’s continuous monitoring will miss some odious uses 
of debt. 
The solution does not address the forgiveness of odious debt under a trust 
indenture once a despotic regime has been overthrown.  Sovereigns will 
need to defer to traditional debt restructurings with the bondholders when in 
this position.  It does, however, permit a sovereign to sue a monitoring 
agent appointed under a fiscal agency agreement if it has breached its duties 
while a despotic regime was in place. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note provided a broad overview of sovereign debt and an in-depth 
look at the doctrine of odious debt.  It outlined the proposed solutions for 
the odious debt doctrine that have developed over time, dividing the 
solutions between ex post and ex ante mechanisms.  Lastly, it proposed an 
expanded role for the standard indenture trustee and fiscal agent in bond 
issuances. 
In its expanded role, the agent would engage in continuous monitoring of 
the use of proceeds and have the power to accelerate bond payments.  This 
Note recognizes that it is impossible to stop odious lending before it starts, 
but it provides a realistic way to enforce the odious debt doctrine by 
utilizing current actors and institutions.  The solution benefits creditors by 
 
 383. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 384. See supra Part I.B.4.c. 
 385. See, e.g., supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
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allowing them to demand payment when proceeds are used odiously.  
Moreover, the solution helps debtor nations by cutting short odious 
expenditures before the damage caused by despotic regimes is complete. 
